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Abstract—We study a multi-antenna broadcast channel with
two legitimate receivers and an external eavesdropper. We as-
sume that the channel matrix of the eavesdropper is unknown to
the legitimate terminals but satisfies a maximum rank constraint.
As our main result we characterize the associated secrecy
degrees of freedom for the broadcast channel with common and
private messages. We show that a direct extension of the single-
user wiretap codebook does not achieve the secrecy degrees of
freedom. Our proposed optimal scheme involves decomposing the
signal space into a common subspace, which can be observed by
both receivers, and private subspaces which can be observed by
only one of the receivers, and carefully transmitting a subset of
messages in each subspace. We also consider the case when each
user’s private message must additionally remain confidential
from the other legitimate receiver and characterize the s.d.o.f.
region in this case.
I. INTRODUCTION
Claude Shannon [1] pioneered the information theoretic
approach for secure communication. Shannon’s notion of
perfect secrecy requires that the information message and the
eavesdropper’s observation be statistically independent. This
framework was later extended to different network models, see
e.g., [2]–[7], where various relaxations of perfect secrecy were
considered and the associated secrecy capacity was studied. In
recent years there has been a growing interest in using multiple
antennas for securing wireless networks, see e.g., [8]–[14]. In
these works generally some sort of side information of the
eavesdropper’s channel — either complete, partial or statistical
— is made available to the legitimate terminals. In contrast
reference [15] considers a single-user Gaussian MIMO wire-
tap channel when the eavesdropper’s channel is unknown
and time-varying, but satisfies a maximum-rank constraint.
The existence of a coding scheme that simultaneously attains
strong secrecy against all feasible eavesdropper channels is
established. Furthermore, two receiver broadcast and multiple-
access channels (MAC) are also treated in [15] when each of
the legitimate terminals has an equal number of antennas and
the optimality of a time-sharing based scheme is established in
either case. Recently a complete characterization of the secure
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degrees of freedom for the two-user MIMO MAC channel
with an arbitrarily varying eavesdropper has been obtained
in [16].
In this paper, we consider the two-receiver MIMO broadcast
channel when there is a private message for each receiver as
well as a common message for both receivers. The messages
must remain confidential from an eavesdropper. We assume
that the channel matrices of the legitimate terminals are
known to all the terminals whereas the channel matrix of the
eavesdropper is only known to the eavesdropper. However
an upper bound on the rank of the eavesdropper channel
matrix, or equivalently the maximum number of antennas
at the eavesdropper is known. We characterize the secrecy
degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) region for such a model, as well
as a variation when the private messages must also remain
mutually confidential from the other receiver. Interestingly
the optimal scheme does not follow from a direct extension
of the techniques used in the single-user channel [15]. Such
an approach introduces independent randomization in each
user’s codebook and creates higher than necessary interfer-
ence between users. Instead our proposed approach involves
decomposing the signal space into a common subspace seen
by both receivers and private subspaces seen by only one
of the receivers; and transmitting a fictitious message of just
enough rate such that it can simultaneously provide secrecy for
both users. We show that the s.d.o.f. achieved by the proposed
scheme are in-fact optimal and meet the natural cut-set upper
bound for the broadcast network. In contrast the scheme based
on the single-user codebooks is sub-optimal in general. We
limit our work to the case when the eavesdropper’s channel is
fixed throughout the duration of communication, but unknown
to the legitimate terminals.
We note that the literature on secure network coding [18],
[19] is also related to our setup. The most closely related
paper to our present work is reference [20], which considers
an extension of secure network coding for broadcasting to
two receivers. The combined message of both users maps
to a syndrome vector of a maximum rank distance (MRD)
code (c.f. [19]). The parity-check matrix of the MRD code
is designed to be in a certain systematic form, so that each
receiver is able to recover the desired message from the
observed sequence. While the results in the present paper
2are structurally similar to [20], our underlying approach is
very different. Instead of attempting a direct extension of
the MRD codes to Gaussian channels we propose a random
coding technique where an explicit fictitious message, shared
by both the receivers is also transmitted. The key insight in
our proposed scheme is to minimize the rate associated with
this fictitious messages by using a carefully constructed signal
space decomposition.
In the remainder of the paper, we present the system model
in Section II and a summary of the main results in Section III.
In section IV we present a reduction of the MIMO broadcast
channel into independent parallel channels, which is based
on the Generalized Singular Value Decomposition. Thereafter
sections V and VI provide proofs of the main results and
section VII concludes the paper.
Throughout this paper we only focus on the case of two
legitimate receivers. Unfortunately an extension of our results
to more than two receivers may not be straightforward. Indeed
to the best of our knowledge, the degrees of freedom of the
MIMO broadcast channel even without secrecy constraints
remains an open problem when both common and private (in-
dividual) messages are considered. The well known compound
MIMO broadcast channel is a special case of this setup [21]–
[23]. Furthermore our lower bound involves the GSVD trans-
form, whose direct extension to more than two channels does
not appear straightforward and therefore we only limit to the
case of two legitimate receivers. Nevertheless we believe that
the setup considered in this paper is of practical significance.
Further note that in this paper we only consider the secrecy
degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.), which measures the pre-log of
the achievable rates. While a considerably coarse measure
of the capacity region, the s.d.o.f. analysis is tractable and
provides important insights into the optimal scheme in the
high signal-to-noise-ratio regime. For some prior works on
s.d.o.f., see e.g., [4], [13]–[16], [24].
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a MIMO Broadcast (BC) wiretap channel with
two receivers, as shown in Figure 1. We assume that the
number of antennas at the transmitter, receiver 1, receiver 2
and the eavesdropper are given by NT , NR1 , NR2 and NE
respectively:
Yt(i) = Ht ·X(i) + Zt(i), t = 1, 2 (1)
Y˜(i) = H˜ ·X(i) (2)
where Yt(i) denotes the symbols received at the legitimate
receivers at time i whereas Y˜(i) denotes the received symbols
at the eavesdropper, Ht and H˜ are the channel matrices and
Zt is the additive Gaussian noise observed by the intended
receiver t, which is composed of independent rotationally in-
variant complex Gaussian random variables with unit variance.
Remark 1: Note that in (2) we do not assume any noise
on the eavesdropper’s channel. In practice the eavesdropper’s
channel will have some additive noise and its observation
will be a degraded version of (2). Thus our achievability
results immediately apply to such degraded channels. As such
the model we study in (2) is the worst case model among
all eavesdropper channels. While the converse for the above
model does not directly apply, it can be easily extended
to show that the s.d.o.f. region does not increase when the
eavesdropper’s channel has additive noise.
Note that the rank of H˜ in (2) is upper bounded by
NE , which is known to all the terminals. The realization
H˜ = h˜ is revealed only to the eavesdropper and not to the
legitimate terminals. Throughout this paper we will assume
that NE < NT , since otherwise the secrecy degrees of
freedom is zero in the single-user setup [15]. Similarly if either
NE ≥ NR1 or NE ≥ NR2 the s.d.o.f. for at least one of the
receivers is zero and the problem degenerates to the single user
case. Thus we also assume that NE < min(NR1 , NR2). Our
proposed setup guarantees confidentiality regardless of the
particular channel realization of the eavesdropper. In contrast,
the channel matrices Ht are known to both the legitimate
parties and the eavesdropper(s).
In practice note that the complete lack of the eavesdropper’s
CSI at the legitimate terminals is far more realistic than the
previous models studied with partial or full knowledge, given
that the eavesdropper is a passive observer who does not
transmit signals. The limit on NE can be justified since the
passive eavesdropping device must be stealth, and hence be
limited in number of antennas due to size limitations.
The input symbols in (2), denoted by X(i), must satisfy
the average power constraint:
E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
trace
(
X(i)XH(i)
)]
≤ P¯ . (3)
We next define the associated secure broadcast code. Re-
ceiver t must decode a confidential message Wt, and a
common confidential message W0 over n channel uses. The
messages (W0,W1,W2) must be kept jointly confidential
from the eavesdropper. Let Y˜n
h˜
denote the signals received
by the eavesdropper when its channel matrix H˜ equals h˜. We
impose the following secrecy constraint:
w
(
lim
n→∞
1
n
sup
h˜
I(W0,W1,W2; Y˜
n
h˜
)
)
= 0, (4)
where w(x) = limP¯→∞ xlog
2
P¯
. To interpret the secrecy con-
straint in (4), note that 1
n
I(W0,W1,W2; Y˜
n
h˜
) is the informa-
tion leakage-rate [30, sec 22.1, pp. 550] at the eavesdropper.
The constraint in (4) only requires that the pre-log of the
asymptotic leakage-rate at the eavesdropper be zero. Note that
this condition is weaker than the usual notion of weak secrecy
which requires that the information leakage-rate approach
must zero asymptotically in n. Strictly speaking, we should
refer to (4) as the secrecy-DOF constraint, but we drop the
“DOF” for simplicity in this paper. We primarily consider this
notion as it suffices to highlight the key ideas in the coding
scheme proposed in the paper. We point the reader to [15]
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Fig. 1. The MIMO Broadcast Wiretap Channel where NT = 3, NR1 =
NR2 = 2, NE = 1.
for the for the analysis of strong secrecy and time-varying
eavesdropper channels in the single user case.
When an additional constraint of mutual privacy is imposed
on the messages W1 and W2 we further require that:
w
(
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(W1;Y
n
2 )
)
= 0 (5)
w
(
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(W2;Y
n
1 )
)
= 0 (6)
The secrecy rate tuple (Rs,0, Rs,1, Rs,2) is achievable if
Rs,i = limn→∞
1
n
H(Wi), i = 0, 1, 2 and a sequence of
encoding and decoding functions exists (indexed by n) such
that the error probability in decoding of {W0,Wt} by receiver
t approaches zero as n → ∞ and furthermore the secrecy
constraints (4) is satisfied. In addition when a mutual privacy
constraint is imposed we also require that (5) and (6) be
satisfied.
In this paper, we use the secrecy degrees of freedom
(s.d.o.f.) region as a characterization of the high SNR be-
haviour of the secrecy capacity for this channel. The s.d.o.f.
pair (d0, d1, d2) is achievable if there exists a sequence of
achievable rates (Rs,0(P¯ ), Rs,1(P¯ ), Rs,2(P¯ )), indexed by P¯ ,
such that di = lim supP¯→∞
Rs,i(P¯ )
log
2
P¯
for i = 0, 1, 2. The set of
all achievable (d0, d1, d2) is called the s.d.o.f. region.
III. MAIN RESULTS
The secrecy degrees of freedom region is characterized
using rank of the associated channel matrices. Let r1, r2 be
the rank of H1 and H2 respectively. Let
r0 = rank
[
H1
H2
]
(7)
and let
s = r1 + r2 − r0 (8)
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Fig. 2. Achievable Secrecy Degrees of Freedom for the two-user MIMO
broadcast channel with an external eavesdropper. We fix the s.d.o.f. of the
common message to d0 and plot (d1, d2). The shaded area corresponds
the s.d.o.f. achievable with mutual privacy constraint. The figure on the left
corresponds to the case when s ≤ d0 + NE while the figure on the right
corresponds to the case when s ≥ d0 +NE .
be the dimension of the common row-space of H1 and H2.
Theorem 1: The secrecy degrees of freedom region for
the MIMO broadcast wiretap channel in absence of the
mutual privacy constraint is given by all non-negative triples
(d0, d1, d2) that satisfy the following constraints:
0 ≤ d0 + di ≤ {ri −NE}
+, i = 1, 2 (9)
0 ≤ d0 + d1 + d2 ≤ {r0 −NE}
+ (10)
where we use the notation that {v}+ ∆= max(0, v).
The inequalities in Theorem 1 can be interpreted as the
cut-set bounds in the broadcast network. The two inequalities
in (9) are single user bounds, whereas the inequality in (10)
corresponds to the case when both the receivers are allowed to
cooperate. Our proof of the coding theorem shows that these
bounds are also achievable, whereas the converse involves
selecting the specific eavesdropper channel gains that lead to
these upper bounds.
Theorem 2: The secrecy degrees of freedom region for the
MIMO broadcast wiretap channel in presence of the mutual
privacy constraint (5) and (6) consists of all non-negative
triples (d0, d1, d2) that satisfy the following constraints:
0 ≤ d0 + di ≤ {ri −NE}
+, i = 1, 2, (11)
0 ≤ di ≤ {ri − s}
+, i = 1, 2. (12)
The inequalities in (11) corresponds to single-user bounds
associated with each receiver, whereas the inequalities in (12)
correspond to transmission of only a private message to each
receiver, with the other receiver as the only eavesdropper in
the network. Note that the sum-constraint is not active in
Theorem 2.
Fig. 2 compares the results in Theorem 1 and 2. We observe
that the structure of the capacity region takes one of two
forms. In case 1, we assume that
N ′E
∆
= d0 +NE ≥ s. (13)
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Fig. 3. The decomposition of the 3× 2× 2× 1 MIMO Broadcast Wiretap
channel (cf. Fig. 1) using the GSVD transform. The channel matrices of the
legitimate receivers are scaled versions of [I2,0] and [0, I2] respectively,
while the eavesdropper channel matrix is of rank at most 1.
It can be verified that the two constraints in (9) imply (10) (by
adding the constraints (9) and using (8) and (13)). Therefore
the projection of the s.d.o.f. region in the (d1, d2) plane
reduces to a rectangle
di ≤ {ri −N
′
E}
+, i = 1, 2 (14)
and the sum-rate constraint is not active. Furthermore upon
examining (11) and (12), one can conclude that the same
region is also achieved in Theorem 2, where an additional
mutual privacy constraint is imposed.
In case 2, which corresponds to N ′E ≤ s, the sum-rate
constraint (10) is active. It can be easily verified that the
constraints (9) and (10), using (8), reduce to di ≤ ri − N ′E ,
and d1 + d2 ≤ r1 + r2 − s − N ′E . Thus as shown in Fig. 2,
(d1, d2) = (r1−s, r2−N
′
E) and (d1, d2) = (r1−N ′E, r2−s)
are the two corner points in the (d1, d2) plane. Furthermore
examining (11), (12) in Theorem 2, the active constraints in
the case when N ′E ≤ s are di ≤ {ri − s}+ for i = 1, 2.
This region is in general smaller than the region achieved in
Theorem 1.
As a final remark we note that when NE = 0, i.e., the
eavesdropper is absent, the result here is equivalent to the
degrees of freedom for the two-user MIMO broadcast channel
with common and private messages [25].
IV. GENERALIZED SINGULAR VALUE DECOMPOSITION
A common element in code construction in both Theo-
rem 1 and 2 is the Generalized Singular Value Decomposition
(GSVD) [26] previously used in [9] in the MIMO wiretap
channel literature. The GSVD transform can be used to
decompose the channel in (1) into parallel and independent
channels, which are more amenable to analysis.
Theorem 3: [26] There exist unitary matrices U,V,W,Q
and a nonsingular upper triangular matrix R such that
UHH1Q = Σ1(NR1×r0)
[
WHR(r0×r0),0
]
(r0×NT )
(15)
VHH2Q = Σ2(NR2×r0)
[
WHR(r0×r0),0
]
(r0×NT )
(16)
Σ1 =

 I1(r˜1×r˜1) S1(s×s)
O1((NR1−r˜1−s)×r˜2)

 (17)
Σ2 =

 O2((NR2−r˜2−s)×r˜1) S2(s×s)
I2(r˜2×r˜2)

 (18)
where Si, i = 1, 2 are s×s diagonal matrices with positive real
elements on the diagonal line, Ii, i = 1, 2 are r˜i × r˜i identity
matrices and the matrices Oi, i = 1, 2 are zero matrices.
For clarity, the dimension of each matrix is shown in the
parenthesis in the subscript. Recall from (7) and (8) that r0
equals the rank of
[
H1
H2
]
, r1 and r2 equal the rank of H1
and H2, and we let s = r1 + r2 − r0. The constants r˜i, for
i = 1, 2, are given by r˜i = ri − s.
We next demonstrate the simultaneous reduction of the
channel matrices Hi, i = 1, 2 into parallel and independent
channels using the GSVD transform. Let the decomposition
of Hi be as in (15) and (16). We left-multiply the transmitted
signals with Q, left-multiply the received signals with UH at
receiver 1, and left-multiply the received signals with VH at
receiver 2. Since Q, UH and VH are all unitary matrices the
setup is equivalent to the following:
Yt(i) = Σt
[
P(r0×r0),0
]
X(i) + Zt(i), t = 1, 2, (19)
Y˜(i) = H˜X(i), (20)
where we have introduced the matrix P ∆= WHR. We also
set the last NT − r0 component of X to zero and design the
achievable scheme for the following channel model:
Yt(i) = ΣtP(r0×r0)X(r0×1)(i) + Zt(i), t = 1, 2, (21)
Y˜(i) = {H˜Q}(NE×r0)X(r0×1)(i), (22)
where {H˜Q}(NE×r0) denotes the first r0 columns of the
matrix H˜Q. Since P is nonsingular, without loss of gener-
ality, we can view PX(r0×1)(i) as the input to the chan-
nel. The main channel can then be expressed as Yt(i) =
ΣtX(r0×1)(i) + Zt(i), t = 1, 2 and the eavesdropper channel
reduces to Y˜(i) = {H˜Q}(NE×r0)P−1X(r0×1)(i). Note that
the eavesdropper channel state matrix is arbitrary, and Q
is a unitary matrix, and thus it can be easily seen that the
rank of {H˜Q}(NE×r0)P−1 is the same as rank of H˜(NE×r0).
Therefore we can simply replace {H˜Q}(NE×r0)P−1 with
H˜(NE×r0). Thus it suffices to consider the following channel
model instead:
Yt(i) = ΣtX(r0×1)(i) + Zt(i), t = 1, 2 (23)
Y˜(i) = H˜(NE×r0)X(r0×1)(i) (24)
5subject to the following constraint:
E
[
1
n
trace
{
(PXn) (PXn)
H
}]
≤ P¯ (25)
where PXn denotes the vector formed by concatenating
{PX(i)}1≤i≤n. Recall that if s2P denotes the largest eigen-
value of PHP then we have that:
trace{(PX(i))(PX(i))H} ≤ s2
P
trace{X(i)X(i)H}. (26)
Hence when designing achievable scheme, we use the follow-
ing power constraint, which is a sufficient condition for (25)
to hold:
E
[
1
n
trace(Xn(Xn)H)
]
≤
P¯
s2
P
(27)
We further reduce the channel (23) to obtain equivalent
parallel channels. Let smin be the minimal nonzero element
among all diagonal elements in S1 and S2. Replace all diag-
onal nonzero elements of Σt with smin and let the resulting
matrix be Σ¯t. We present our coding scheme for the following
channel:
Yt(i) = Σ¯tX(r0×1)(i) + Zt(i), t = 1, 2 (28)
Y˜(i) = H˜(NE×r0)(i)X(r0×1)(i) (29)
If we let:
X(r0×1)(i) =

 Xr˜1(i)Xs(i)
Xr˜2(i)

 }r˜1 rows}s rows
}r˜2 rows
(30)
then the two equations given in (28) reduce to the following
Y1(i) = smin
[
Xr˜1(i)
Xs(i)
]
+ Z1(i), (31)
Y2(i) = smin
[
Xs(i)
Xr˜2(i)
]
+ Z2(i). (32)
Thus (31) and (32) denote a collection of parallel, independent
and identically distributed channels between the transmitter
and the legitimate receivers. The channels with input Xs(i)
denote the common channels observed by both receivers,
whereas the channels with input Xr˜1(i) and Xr˜2(i) are only
observed by receivers 1 and 2 respectively.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We first present the key ideas in the coding scheme for a
special example, and then present the coding scheme for the
general case.
A. A Motivating Example: 3× 2× 2× 1 Channel
Consider the special case when NT = 3, NE = 1 and
NR1 = NR2 = 2. For simplicity, we assume that the common
message W0 is not present. Assume that r1 = r2 = 2 and
r0 = 3 and all the channel matrices are full rank. Following
the reduction in (31) and (32), the channel matrices of the two
legitimate receivers reduce to:
H1 = [I(2×2),0(2×1)], H2 = [0(2×1), I(2×2)] (33)
while the effective channel matrix of the eavesdropper is an
arbitrary rank one matrix. Assume that we do not impose a
mutual secrecy constraint and let d0 = 0. Thus according to
Theorem 1 we seek to achieve d1 = d2 = 1.
Recall that in (1), the vectorX denotes the transmitter input.
Since the transmitter has three antennas, i.e., NT = 3, X has
three components. To achieve d1 = 1, a single-user wiretap
codebook C1 for user 1 requires transmission over the first
and the second component of X. Likewise to achieve d2 = 1,
a single-user wiretap codebook C2 requires transmission over
the second and third component. Thus the two codebooks must
share the second component of X. However, since W1 and
W2 are independent, the signals that C1 uses to represent W1
over the second component of X in general do not agree with
the signals that C2 uses to represent W2 over this component,
causing a conflict. Thus we cannot simultaneously achieve
d1 = 1 and d2 = 1 using this approach.
Our proposed scheme in Theorem 1 resolves this conflict
by constructing three codebooks, one for each component
of X. A codebook for the second component of X, CE , is
used to transmit a fictitious message WE via a codeword
XnE(WE). An independent codebook C1 is used to jointly
encode (WE ,W1) into a codeword Xn1 (WE ,W1) which is
transmitted over the first component of X. Another codebook
C2 for the third component of X is used to transmit a code-
word Xn2 (WE ,W2). Through random coding analysis, as will
be discussed later, one can show that users 1 and 2 can decode
(W1,WE) and (W2,WE) upon observing (Xn1 , XnE) and
(Xn2 , X
n
E) respectively, with high probability. Furthermore as
will be shown in the sequel, the messages (W1, W2) remain
simultaneously confidential from any eavesdropper with a
single receive antenna.
To summarize the above example, note that the naive
extension of the single-user codebook involves independent
randomization in the codebooks of the two users. This effec-
tively injects fictitious messages of a higher rate and in turn
reduces the message rate. In contrast the proposed scheme
introduces a fictitious message of minimum possible rate
needed to guarantee secrecy.
In generalizing the above example to arbitrary number of
antennas, we use three i.i.d. Gaussian codebooks, and assign a
subset of parallel channels for each codeword. The rate of the
codebooks is selected such that the average error probability at
the legitimate receivers under maximum likelihood decoding
is arbitrarily small. We also show in section V-C that if
the information messages are revealed to the eavesdropper,
the error probability in decoding the fictitious message given
the eavesdropper’s observation, also vanishes to zero. For a
codebook satisfying these properties, we provide the secrecy
analysis in section V-D and complete the proof of the coding
theorem. We note that this approach of secrecy analysis, where
6the eavesdropper is able to decode the fictitious message
given side information, is routinely used when establishing
the achievability of weak-secrecy.
B. Achievability
Since the secrecy rate is zero whenever r0 ≤ NE (c.f. [15]),
without loss of generality, we assume r0 > NE and consider
H˜ that has the following form:
H˜ = [INE×NE ,0NE×(r0−NE)]UE
∆
= U˜E (34)
where UE is a unitary matrix, which is only known by the
eavesdropper, and U˜E represents the first NE rows of UE .
Furthermore recall that the legitimate receiver’s channel are
parallel independent broadcast channels:
Y1(i) = smin
[
Xr˜1(i)
Xs(i)
]
+ Z1(i) (35)
Y2(i) = smin
[
Xs(i)
Xr˜2(i)
]
+ Z2(i) (36)
As in [15], [27], we then introduce artificial noise into X
as:
X(i) = X¯(r0×1)(i) +N(i) (37)
where N is the r0 × 1 artificial noise vector consisting of
independent rotationally invariant complex Gaussian random
variables with zero mean and unit variance. In contrast X¯
is the information bearing signal which will be used in the
codebook transmission.
Let P be such that P = P¯
s2
P
−r0 (c.f. (27)). We shall allocate
a total power of r0 units on artificial noise N in (37) and P
units on X¯. Let the rate R be defined by:
R = C(s2min(P/r0)/(s
2
min + 1)) (38)
where C (x) ∆= log2 (1 + x). Note that R is the rate supported
over each parallel channel in (35) and (36).
We sample our codebooks from an i.i.d. Gaussian random
ensemble as discussed next. Let ǫ¯ > 0 be a fixed con-
stant. Let Qk(x) denote the k-dimensional rotationally in-
variant complex Gaussian distribution with covariance matrix
(P (1− ǫ¯)/r0)I(k×k) where Ik×k denotes an identity matrix of
dimension k. Define the n-letter Gaussian input distribution
Qk(x
n) as Qk(x
n) =
n∏
i=1
Qk (xi). In the following we
consider transmission of four messages Wi ∈ [1, 2ndiR],
W0 ∈ [1, 2
nd0R] and WE ∈ [1, 2nNER], where W0 is the
common message and W1 and W2 are the private messages
that need to be decoded by receivers 1 and 2 respectively. The
message WE is a fictitious message. As in (13) we define N ′E
using:
N ′E = NE + d0. (39)
Such a notation is again convenient, since in our coding
scheme we will jointly code the message pair (WE ,W0) of a
total rate 2nR(NE+d0). We separately consider the case when
s ≤ N ′E and when s > N ′E .
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Fig. 4. Codebook generation: (1) s ≤ NE + d0 ≤ min{r1, r2} (2) 0 ≤
NE + d0 < s. Here s = r1 + r2 − r0 denotes the dimension of the
common subspace. The shaded blue region indicates the dimensions where
the common and fictitious messages i.e., X¯n
B
(W0,WE) are transmitted. The
shaded black portion indicate the dimensions where the private messages are
transmitted. In case (1), in addition to the common subspace, we further need
to use (NE+d0−s) dimensions of each private subspace for transmitting the
common message. In case (2), we have a surplus (s−NE−d0) dimensions in
the common subspace. These can be used for transmitting private messages.
Therefore the sum-rate constraint in Theorem 1 is active in this case.
1) Case 1 (s ≤ N ′E ≤ min(r1, r2)): In this case recall
from Theorem 1 and Fig. 2 that the (d1, d2) region is a rect-
angle. It suffices to show that any triple (d˜0, d˜1, d˜2) such that
d˜0 ≤ N
′
E −NE and d˜i ≤ ri −N ′E for i = 1, 2, is achievable.
Following the decomposition illustrated in Figure 4 let:
X¯(r0×1)(i) =

 X¯A(i)X¯B(i)
X¯C(i)

 }r1 −N ′E rows}2N ′E − s rows
}r2 −N
′
E rows
(40)
We let the three components above correspond to three
different codebooks CA, CB and CC indicated below.
• The codebook CB maps the message-pair (W0,WE)
to a codeword X¯nB(W0,WE). It consists of 2n(N
′
ER)
codewords. Each codeword is sampled in an i.i.d. fash-
ion from the distribution Q(2N ′
E
−s)(x). The codeword
is transmitted through the component X¯B in (40) as
discussed below.
X¯B(i) =

 X¯B1(i)X¯B0(i)
X¯B2(i)

 }N ′E − s rows}s rows
}N ′E − s rows
(41)
and let X¯s(i) = X¯B0(i), and furthermore
X¯r˜1(i) =
[
X¯A(i)
X¯B1(i)
]
X¯r˜2(i) =
[
X¯B2(i)
X¯C(i)
]
, (42)
where the vectors X¯s(i), X¯r˜1(i) and X¯r˜2(i) are inputs
into the parallel channels in (30).
• The codebook CA maps a message pair (W0,W1,WE)
to a codeword X¯nA(W0,W1,WE). It consists of a total
of 2n((d˜0+d˜1+NE)R) codewords each sampled in an i.i.d.
fashion from the distribution Q(r1−N ′E)(x). The code-
word will be transmitted through X¯A.
• The codebook CC maps the message pair (W0,W2,WE)
to a codeword X¯nC(W0,W2,WE). It consists of a total of
2n((d˜0+d˜2+NE)R) codewords. Each codeword is sampled
in an i.i.d. fashion from the distribution Q(r2−N ′E)(x).
7Given a message pair (W0,W1,W2,WE) the encoder gen-
erates the associated sequence X¯n (c.f. (40)) and transmits
Xn (c.f. (37)) over n channel uses. We declare an error if
Xn does not satisfy the average power constraint (cf. (3)).
By selecting n to be sufficiently large, this error can be made
arbitrarily small.
The received signal Yn1 (c.f. (31)) at receiver 1 can be
expressed as:
Y1(i) =

 YA(i)YB1(i)
Ys(i)

 }r1 −N ′E rows}N ′E − s rows
}s rows
. (43)
Receiver 1 decodes (W0,W1,WE) in the following order:
1) Decode (W0,WE) from (YnB1,Yns ) using a maximal
likelihood decoder:
(Wˆ0, WˆE) = arg max
w0,wE
Pr
(
X¯nB(w0, wE)|Y
n
B1,Y
n
s
)
(44)
2) Decode W1 from YnA using a maximal likelihood de-
coder:
Wˆ1 = argmax
w1
Pr
(
X¯nA(Wˆ0, w1, WˆE)|Y
n
A
)
(45)
It can be shown through standard analysis1 that the error
probability in (44) approaches zero provided (R0, RE) satisfy
the following:
R0 +RE < I(X¯B ;YB1,Ys) = N
′
ER (46)
where the rate R is the rate associated with each parallel
channel (38). This shows that any d˜0 ≤ N ′E − NE = d0
(c.f. (39)) is achievable at user 1. Furthermore the error
probability in (45) vanishes to zero provided that
R1 < I(X¯A;YA) = (r1 −N
′
E)R (47)
is satisfied i.e., d˜1 ≤ r1 −N ′E is achievable for user 1. In an
analogous manner we can show that d˜0 = N ′E − NE and
d˜2 = r2 −N
′
E are achievable for user 2.
2) Case 2 (N ′E < s): In this case the sum-rate constraint in
Theorem 1 is active. We show that d˜0 ≤ N ′E−NE as well as
the corner point (d˜1, d˜2) = (r1−N ′E, r2−s) is achievable. By
a symmetric argument it follows that the corner point (r1 −
s, r2−N
′
E) is also achievable. The achievability of the entire
region then follows using a time-sharing argument.
To define our code construction, we begin by splitting the
input symbols X¯s in (30) into two groups:
X¯s =
[
X¯s1
X¯s2
]
}s−N ′E rows
}N ′E rows
(48)
1 If a joint-typicality based decoder is used we still obtain the same
rate. However the maximum likelihood decoder also guarantees that the
error probability approaches zero exponentially with the block-length [28,
(7.3.22)]. This particular scaling is useful in showing the existence of a
single universal codebook that remains confidential against all eavesdropper
channels simultaneously as done in the single user case [15].
Define X¯A as
X¯A =
[
X¯r˜1
X¯s1
]
}r˜1 rows
}s−N ′E rows
, (49)
where X¯r˜1 constitutes the input to parallel channels of receiver
1 in (30). Let X¯B = X¯s2 and X¯C = X¯r˜2 . The overall input
vector is expressed via X¯ =

 X¯AX¯B
X¯C

 .
As before we use X¯A to send W1 to user 1, use X¯C to send
W2 to user 2, and use the second group X¯B for sending W0
and WE . The associated codebook construction is discussed
next.
• The codebook CB that maps the message pair (W0,WE)
to a codeword X¯nB(W0,WE). It consists of 2n(N
′
ER)
codewords. Each codeword is sampled in an i.i.d. fashion
from the distribution QNE(x).
• The codebook CA that maps each message pair
(W0,W1,WE) to a codeword
X¯nA(W0,W1,WE). It consists of a total of 2n((r1−N
′
E)R)
codewords. Each codeword is sampled in an i.i.d. fashion
from the distribution Q(r1−N ′E)(x).
• The codebook CC maps the message pair (W0,W2,WE)
to a codeword X¯nC(W0,W2,WE). It consists of a total of
2n((r2−s)R) codewords each sampled in an i.i.d. fashion
from the distribution Q(r2−s)(x).
Upon receiving Yn1 (c.f. (31)), receiver 1 decomposes each of
its component Y1(i) as:
Y1(i) =
[
YA(i)
Ys(i)
]
}r1 −N
′
E rows
}N ′E rows
. (50)
Receiver 1 decodes (W0,W1,WE) in the following order:
1) Decode (W0,WE) from Yns using the maximal likeli-
hood decoder:
(Wˆ0, WˆE) = arg max
w0,wE
Pr
(
X¯nB(w0, wE)|Y
n
s
) (51)
2) Decode W1 from YnA using the maximal likelihood
decoder in (45).
It can be shown that the error probability associated with (51)
vanishes to zero if R0 + RE < I(X¯B ;Ys) = N ′ER. This
shows that d˜0 ≤ N ′E − NE = d0 is achievable. Likewise
the error probability associated with message W1 vanishes to
zero if R1 < I(X¯A;YA) = (r1 − N ′E)R. This shows that
d˜1 ≤ r1 −N
′
E is achievable for user 1.
In an analogous matter we can show that the error prob-
ability at user 2 vanishes to zero if d˜0 ≤ N ′E − NE and
d˜2 ≤ r2 − s.
C. Side Information Assisted Decoding at Eavesdropper
We next argue that in the codebook ensemble (CA × CB ×
CC) there exists at-least one codebook such that the eavesdrop-
per can also reliably decode WE given (W0,W1,W2). Such
a codebook will be used in the analysis of equivocation in the
8next sub-section. Our proposed decoder is also a maximum
likelihood decoder as stated below:
WˆE = argmax
wE
Pr
(
X¯nA(Wˆ0, Wˆ1, wE), X¯
n
B(Wˆ0, wE),
X¯nC(Wˆ0, Wˆ2, wE)|Y˜
n
h˜
)
(52)
where (Wˆ0, Wˆ1, Wˆ2) denote the messages revealed to the
eavesdropper. The error probability decays to zero if the rate
RE satisfies:
RE < I(X¯A, X¯B, X¯C ; Y˜h˜) (53)
= I(X¯A, X¯B, X¯C ; U˜EX¯+ U˜EN) (54)
= log det
(
I+
P
r0
U˜EU˜
H
E
)
(55)
= NE log
(
1 +
P
r0
)
(56)
where U˜E denotes the first NE rows of the unitary matrixUE
(c.f. (34)). We further substitute (37) in (54), (55) follows
from the fact that the entries of X˜ are sampled i.i.d. from
CN(0, P/r0) and the last relation uses U˜EU˜HE = INE .
Since we select RE = NER, where R (c.f. (38)) satisfies
R ≤ log
(
1 + P
r0
)
, it follows (56) is indeed satisfied. This
shows that in the ensemble of codebooks there exists at-
least one codebook such that WE is reliably decoded by the
eavesdropper with a fixed channel matrix h˜. Thus using Fano’s
inequality:
H
(
WE |Y˜
n
h˜
,W0,W1,W2
)
≤ nǫn (57)
for some sequence ǫn that converges to zero as n → ∞.
Using a standard union bound argument it follows that there
is at-least one codebook which can be reliably decoded by the
legitimate receivers and that satisfies (57).
In order to establish the secrecy constraint (4), we need
to demonstrate that there exists a single codebook that sat-
isfies (57) for every possible realization of the eavesdropper
channel matrix H˜, whose rank equals NE . The existence of
such codebooks generally follows from the compound channel
coding theorem [30, Theorem 7.1 (pp. 170), Remark 7.3
(pp. 172)], [31, Eq. (11)]. We remark that when the set of
possible states H˜ is finite, the proof of the compound channel
coding theorem exploits a union bound argument over the
states. In the present case H˜ belongs to a continuous set.
Therefore a simple union bound argument cannot be applied.
Suitable quantization of the channel matrices is needed to
show that the error probability simultaneously goes to zero for
each state. We refer the reader to [15] where such an argument
was carefully outlined for the single-user case, but leave out
a detailed argument in the present paper as it is analogous2.
2One key difference required in the extension to continuous set of channels
is that we cannot sample the codewords i.i.d. and then use expurgation to
satisfy the power constraint as is commonly done (see e.g., [29, pp. 243-
245]). Instead we need to sample codewords from a normalized distribution,
so that they lie within a ball. We refer the reader to [15] for further details.
We note that such a codebook guarantees that (57) is satisfied
for any H˜ whose rank equals NE i.e.,
sup
h˜: rank(h˜)=NE
H
(
WE |Y˜
n
h˜
,W0,W1,W2
)
≤ nǫn. (58)
D. Equivocation analysis
It suffices to demonstrate the secrecy constraint when the
rank of H˜ equals NE . If the rank is smaller than NE the
secrecy constraint clearly holds for this weaker eavesdropper.
We shall only present the secrecy analysis for N ′E ≥ s. The
analysis for N ′E < s is completely analogous. As discussed
in section V-C, we consider a codebook that satisfies (58).
H
(
W0,W1,W2|Y˜
n
h˜
)
≥ I
(
W0,W1,W2; X¯
n|Y˜n
h˜
)
(59)
=H
(
X¯n|Y˜n
h˜
)
−H
(
X¯n|Y˜n
h˜
,W0,W1,W2
)
(60)
=H
(
X¯n|Y˜n
h˜
)
−H
(
WE |Y˜
n
h˜
,W0,W1,W2
)
(61)
=H
(
X¯n
)
− I
(
X¯n; Y˜n
h˜
)
−H
(
WE |Y˜
n
h˜
,W0,W1,W2
)
(62)
where (61) follows from the fact that X¯n is a deterministic
function of (W0,WE ,W1,W2).
On the other hand since rank(h˜) = NE it can be shown
that:
w
(
lim
n→∞
1
n
I
(
X¯n; Y˜n
h˜
))
≤ NE . (63)
For the first term in (62), since H(X¯n) =
H(W0,W1,W2,WE) we have:
w
(
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(X¯n)
)
= d˜0 + d˜1 + d˜2 +NE (64)
Applying (58), (63) and (64) to (59)-(62), we have that
w
(
lim
n→∞
1
n
sup
h˜
H(W0,W1,W2|Y
n
h˜
)
)
≥ d˜0 + d˜1 + d˜2
(65)
as required. This completes the proof of our coding theorem.
E. Converse
We now establish the upper bounds stated in (9) and (10).
The two upper bounds in (9) are single-user bounds whereas
the upper bound in (10) involves the sum-rate. These bounds
correspond to the three cuts in the broadcast network [30].
For each cut, as discussed below we find the worst case
eavesdropper channel.
Recall that the rank ofH1 is r1. To establish (9), we express
(after row permutation if necessary) H1 as
H1 =
[
H11
H12
]
}NE rows
}NR1 −NE rows
. (66)
such that the matrix H12 has a rank of {r1 − NE}+. Since
the eavesdropper channel state is arbitrary, we consider an
9eavesdropper channel for which H˜ = H11 whose rank clearly
equals NE . For any coding scheme we can upper bound the
rate as follows:
n(R0 +R1) = H(W0,W1) (67)
≤ I(W0,W1;Y
n
1 ) + nǫn (68)
≤ I(W0,W1;Y
n
1 )− I(W0,W1; Y˜
n) + 2nǫn (69)
≤ I(W0,W1;Y
n
1 , Y˜
n)− I(W0,W1; Y˜
n) + 2nǫn (70)
= I(W0,W1;Y
n
1 |Y˜
n) + 2nǫn (71)
≤ h(Yn1 |Y˜
n)− h(Yn1 |Y˜
n,W0,W1) + 2nǫn (72)
≤ h(Yn1 |Y˜
n)− h(Yn1 |Y˜
n,W0,W1,X
n) + 2nǫn (73)
= I(W0,W1,X
n;Yn1 |Y˜
n) + 2nǫn (74)
= I(Xn;H1X
n + Zn1 |H11X
n) + 2nǫn (75)
≤ I(Xn;H12X
n + Zn12) + 2nǫn (76)
where Z12 is the last NR1 − NE rows of Z1. The step
(68) follows from Fano’s inequality since (W0,W1) must be
decodable by receiver 1 while (69) is a consequence of the
equivocation constraint. Finally (75) follows from the Markov
Condition that (W0,W1)→ Xn → Yn1 . Since the right hand
side of (76) is upper bounded by the capacity of a MIMO
Gaussian channel [32] and by our construction, the rank of
H12 equals (r1 −NE), it follows that
d0 + d1 ≤ {r1 −NE}
+
. (77)
In a similar fashion, we can show that
d0 + d2 ≤ {r2 −NE}
+
. (78)
To establish sum-rate bound on (W0,W1,W2) we let the two
users cooperate and obtain with H∪ =
[
H1
H2
]
and Z =[
Z1
Z2
]
:
n(R0 +R1 +R2) ≤ I(X
n;H∪X
n + Zn|Y˜n) + 2nǫn.
(79)
Since the rank of H∪ equals r0 = r1+r2−s, we can express
(after suitable row permutations)
H∪ =
[
A
B
]
}NE rows
}NR1 +NR2 −NE rows
. (80)
where the rank of B equals (r0−NE). We further select H˜ =
A of rank NE . Using ZA and ZB to denote the projection of
the noise vector Z onto the rows corresponding to matrices
A and B respectively, the sum-rate can be upper bounded as
follows:
n(R0 +R1 +R2) ≤ I(X
n;H∪X
n + Zn|Y˜n) + 2nǫn (81)
= I(Xn;AXn + ZnA,BX
n + ZnB|AX
n) + 2nǫn (82)
≤ I(Xn;BXn + ZnB) + 2nǫn (83)
Since (83) is upper bounded by the capacity of a MIMO
channel with channel matrix B of rank (r0 −NE) it follows
that
d0 + d1 + d2 ≤ {r0 −NE}
+
. (84)
This completes the proof of the converse.
VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We outline how our results change when an additional mu-
tual privacy constraints across the two receivers are imposed.
For the case when d0 + NE ≥ s, we can in fact use the
same construction as in Section V-B1. Since the message W1
is transmitted only through symbols X¯A(i) which are not
observed by user 2, its mutual privacy constraint is clearly
satisfied. Similarly message W2 is transmitted only through
symbols X¯C(i) which are not observed by user 1. Hence
its mutual privacy constraint is also satisfied. Clearly the
addition of the mutual privacy constraint can only reduce
the achievable d.o.f. and hence the proposed scheme achieves
optimal d.o.f.
When d0 + NE ≤ s we use construction in section V-B2
with N ′E = s. Thus the codebook CB uses all available X¯s
symbols whereas the codebooks CA and CC use X¯r˜1 and X¯r˜2
symbols respectively. It can again be readily verified that any
pair (d0, d1, d2) that satisfies: di ≤ ri − s and d0 ≤ s−NE
is achievable.
For the converse we note that the constraint d0+di ≤ ri−
NE follows from section V-E which does not use the mutual-
privacy constraint. To establish the condition di ≤ ri − s,
we assume that the messages (W0,W2) are revealed to the
two receivers and only consider the transmission of message
W1. The resulting system reduces to a MIMO wiretap channel
where the channel matrices H1 and H2 are known to the
transmitter. As shown in [9] the high SNR capacity is achieved
using the generalized singular value decomposition and the
associated degree of freedom satisfies d1 ≤ r1− s. The upper
bound d2 ≤ r2−s can be established in an analogous manner.
This completes the proof of the converse in Theorem 2.
VII. CONCLUSION
We study the achievable secrecy degrees of freedom re-
gion for a two-receiver MIMO broadcast wiretap channel
where only the rank (or an upper bound on the rank) of
the eavesdropper channel matrix is known to the legitimate
terminals. While a direct extension of the single-user binning
is sub-optimal, we show that the optimal degrees of freedom
can be obtained by simultaneously diagonalizing the channel
matrices of the legitimate receivers and carefully selecting the
transmission on the resulting sub-channels in order to share
a common fictitious message between the two receivers. We
also extend the results to the case when an additional mutual-
privacy constraint is imposed at the receivers.
While the present paper treats the case when the channels
are static, extension to the case when the eavesdropper’s
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channel is time-varying, as considered in [15] in the single-
user case, is left for future work. It will be also interesting
to extend our result to the case of more than two receivers.
This could perhaps require finding a suitable extension of the
GSVD transform to more than two channel matrices. Another
interesting future direction is to consider the case when the
legitimate receiver’s channel are also time-varying. One can
also assume that the transmitter acquires CSI with a unit delay.
A connection to the recent result in [24] appears natural and
worth pursuing. Finally we note that this paper only considers
the degrees of freedom of the broadcast network, which
characterizes the pre-log of achievable rates. Such analysis
is relevant if the network operates in the in the high SNR
regime. The finer characterization of constant-gap analysis is
left for future work .
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